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The e⁄ect of mortality reductions on fertility is one of the main mech-
anisms stressed by the recent growth literature in order to explain demo-
graphic transitions. We analyze the empirical relevance of this mechanism
based on the experience of all countries since 1960. We distinguish be-
tween the e⁄ects on gross and net fertility, take into account the dynamic
nature of the relationship and control for alternative explanatory factors
and for endogeneity. Our results show that mortality plays a large role
in fertility reductions, that the change in fertility behavior comes with a
lag of about 10 years and that both net and gross fertility are a⁄ected.
We ￿nd comparatively little support for explanations of the demographic
transition based on economic development or technological change.
Keywords: mortality, fertility, demographic transitions, uni￿ed growth
models.
1 Introduction
The economic mechanisms explaining demographic transitions have attracted
an increasing amount of attention from the profession over the last decade. In
this paper we contribute to this ongoing literature by providing an extensive
empirical analysis of one of the most important mechanisms used by researchers
to explain these transitions: the e⁄ect of mortality reductions on fertility.
Probably the main reason behind the regain of interest in the demographic
transition has been the development of what are usually called "uni￿ed growth
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1theories". This body of theoretical work has extended the traditional post-war
time horizon of previous growth models in order to understand the passage
from a near-zero steady state growth regime in pre-industrial times to a posi-
tive steady state growth regime from the Industrial Revolution onwards. Most
researchers in the area have stressed the role of the demographic transition in
this context as both cause and e⁄ect of the transition in growth regimes. Uni-
￿ed growth theories build on a large body of literature on fertility decisions
developed from the seminal works of Becker (1960) and Schultz (1969).
The theoretical literature on uni￿ed growth models is by now extensive and
o⁄ers several alternative explanations for the demographic transition. The idea
that mortality rates to a large extent determine fertility outcomes has been
used in numerous uni￿ed growth models such as Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003),
Lagerl￿f (2003), Weisdorf (2004), Soares (2005), Azarnert (2006), Tamura (2006)
and Falcao and Soares (2007). The idea is by no means recent, as it has been
stressed in varying degrees by demographers since the ￿rst formulations of what
became known as "classical transition theory" (Notestein 1945, for a discussion
see Kirk 1996).
Mortality rates are far from being the only determinant of fertility proposed
by the uni￿ed growth literature. An equally large section of the literature points
towards raising GDP per capita (Becker and Lewis 1973, de la Croix and Doepke
2003) or technological progress (Galor and Weil 2000, Jones 2001, Kogel and
Prskawets 2001, Hansen and Prescott 2002, Cervellati and Sunde 2005) as the
cause behind falling fertility. Many additional factors have been used with less
frequency, among which we can mention the decline in the gender wage gap
(Galor and Weil 1996), the reduction in the importance of child labour (Hazan
and Berdugo 2002, Doepke 2004), Darwinian evolution (Galor and Moav 2002)
and the e⁄ects of trade specialization (Galor and Mountford 2006).
In addition to the above, most of the models in this literature reserve an im-
portant role for human capital formation by incorporating Becker￿ s well-known
quantity-quality tradeo⁄ for children in the modelling of fertility decisions. As
a rule, changes in any of the above mentioned factors would tip parental choices
towards more child quality and less child quantity; causing a simultaneous re-
duction in fertility and increase in human capital levels. This increase in human
capital can then be used to accelerate technological innovation, providing a nat-
2ural and attractive link between the demographic transition and the growth
take-o⁄.
It is noteworthy that education has also ￿gured up on demographers￿lists
of variables associated with fertility outcomes. The mechanisms that demogra-
phers have put forward, however, di⁄er signi￿cantly from those used by econo-
mists. Demographers have viewed education as an exogenous factor a⁄ecting
fertility, instead of the endogenous and simultaneous determination of fertility
and education that is embedded in the economists￿models. Demographers have
emphasized the role of schooling in spreading information about contraceptive
methods and, perhaps as important, supporting the idea that the use of these
methods is socially acceptable (Caldwell 1980).
Next to this rich theoretical literature economists￿e⁄orts on the empirical
side look rather meager. Although our understanding of the potential mecha-
nisms a⁄ecting fertility is quite advanced, few attempts have been made to dis-
tinguish quantitatively important factors from secondary ones. Galor (2005a,
2005b) compares alternative explanations for the demographic transition but
limits himself to a graphical analysis and does not consider the evidence from
developing countries. Most other papers only provide some "stylized facts"
based on the experience of one or a few developed countries.
We believe that research e⁄ort in this area needs to be reallocated towards
more empirical work and act in consequence. We focus on the role of mortality
as a driver for fertility change, but will also discuss the e⁄ects of other factors
that will be included as control variables in our empirical analysis. Our analysis
distinguishes itself by exploring several dimensions of the mortality-fertility re-
lationship that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been properly addressed
in the empirical literature: (i) Is the magnitude of the e⁄ect large enough to
account for a demographic transition? (ii) Is net fertility, as apposed to gross
fertility, also a⁄ected by mortality rates?, (iii) What is the time pattern of the
process, how long does it take for mortality changes to a⁄ect fertility?, (iv) How
do the e⁄ects of mortality on fertility compare with those of other factors such
as education, GDP per capita or urbanization? (v) Through what mechanisms
does mortality a⁄ect fertility?
Very few papers in economics have provided careful econometric analyses
of the determinants of fertility levels across countries. A notable exception is
3Schultz (1994), who analyses the role of factors such as schooling and urbaniza-
tion in this context. Schultz does not include mortality rates or GDP per capita
in his analysis, however, which are among the most prominent factors driving
fertility changes in the recent literature. Besides including these last two factors,
our analysis improves on Schultz (1994) in terms of country and time coverage
and econometric techniques. More recent empirical works that are related to
the present one are Lorentzen et al. (2008), who focus on the e⁄ects of mortality
on economic development, and Soares (2006), who deals with the case of Brazil.
Demographers have produced a very large body of empirical work on this
subject over the last decades. Their analyses, however, have usually su⁄ered
from the failure to adopt econometric techniques that are now common in the
economics literature and control for relevant empirical biases1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the theoretical mechanisms linking mortality changes to fertility rates. Section
3 is the core of the paper as it describes the data and empirical methodology we
use and presents our results. Section 4 summarizes and o⁄ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Theoretical mechanisms linking mortality to
fertility
Since the early work by demographers in the area, mortality has been an oft-
cited explanatory factor of the transition in fertility rates. The demographic
literature has traditionally focused on three mechanisms to explain this link
(see, inter alia, Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999): the physiological e⁄ect, the
replacement e⁄ect and the hoarding e⁄ect.
The physiological and replacement e⁄ects are similar in that both of them
point towards an increased likelihood of pregnancy following the death of a
child. With the physiological e⁄ect this happens by necessity through the "sud-
den termination of breastfeeding, which, in turn, triggers resumption of menses
1A large body of work in demography argues against the importance of socioeconomic
factors such as mortality or GDP per capita in demographic transitions (see Coale and Watkins
1986 for an overview). These analyses, however, do not use panel data techniques such as
the inclusion of country ￿xed e⁄ects to control for unobserved country characteristics. Recent
research has shown that controlling for these aspects restores the role of socioeconomic factors
(Brown and Guinnane 2007).
4and ovulation and thus increases the period of exposure to a new conception"
(Palloni and Rafalimanana 1999). The replacement e⁄ect, on the other hand,
refers to the deliberate actions taken by a couple to have an additional birth
in order to "compensate" for the death of an o⁄spring; maybe because of the
existence of a target family size.
While the physiological e⁄ect has naturally not found its way into economic
models, the replacement e⁄ect is to be found in all models of fertility choice in
which parental utility is a function of the number of surviving o⁄springs instead
of the number of births. Note, however, that this modelling choice implies full
replacement by assumption whereas demographers allow for the possibility of
partial replacement (i.e. an increased probability of giving birth in the period
following the death of a child). These two mechanisms imply a positive e⁄ect of
mortality on gross fertility, though the e⁄ect on net fertility is more ambiguous2.
The hoarding e⁄ect, ￿nally, has been the object of more rigorous economic
modelling. We talk of a hoarding e⁄ect when a family decides to have more
births than their optimal number of children in order to protect themselves
against the possibility of future high mortality in the family. Hoarding is an
ex-ante precautionary measure that arises once the randomness of mortality
events is taken into account and induces families to "insure" themselves against
high mortality scenarios by having more births. Sah (1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan
(2002, 2003) present models of fertility choice in which this e⁄ect is at play and
where mortality has a positive e⁄ect on both gross and net fertility.
Before relying too much on the hoarding e⁄ect as an explanation for the
mortality-fertility link, we must note that its magnitude depends rather heavily
on the particular modelling assumptions being made3. Several realistic general-
izations would eliminate or at least attenuate this e⁄ect: parents would be less
likely to hoard children if each birth is costly (as in Cigno 1998) or if they can
take the decision of replacing a child after the occurrence of mortality (as in
Doepke 2005).
It is thus the case that the majority of the economics literature has focused
on another mechanism which did not originate in demography but within eco-
nomics: Becker￿ s quantity-quality tradeo⁄ for children. As is well-known, this
2See below for a discussion of the di⁄erence between gross and net fertility.
3The point has been raised by Galor 2005a.
5mechanism is based on the assumption that parental utility is a function both
of the number of children and of their quality (de￿ned as their level of human
capital). As both rearing and educating children is costly, a tradeo⁄ between
these two activities arises4. A fall in mortality rates is relevant in this context
because it makes investments in human capital more attractive by extending
the time horizon over which such capital can be used. Lower mortality rates
would thus induce a substitution of child quantity for child quality.
Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003), Lagerl￿f (2003), Weisdorf (2004), Soares (2005),
Azarnert (2006), Tamura (2006) and Falcao and Soares (2007) all use some ver-
sion of the above argument to generate a demographic transition and a passage
to a high-growth regime5. It is noteworthy that, within this mechanism, the
decision to invest in a child￿ s human capital is not a⁄ected by mortality rates at
early ages, before human capital investment starts6. Conversely, adult mortality
rates could have an important e⁄ect in this area since much of the bene￿ts of
human capital accumulation can be reaped only in adulthood.
This last consideration suggest a strategy for identifying, at least partially,
which of the above mentioned mechanisms is at play. The physiological e⁄ect
depends exclusively on infant and early childhood mortality since breastfeeding
does not extend beyond this period. The replacement and hoarding e⁄ects
depend in principle on mortality rates at all ages; but since mortality is greatest
during early childhood there would be not much of a loss if post-childhood rates
are excluded. The e⁄ect on fertility through the quantity-quality tradeo⁄, on
the other hand, would depend less on early childhood mortality than on late
childhood and adult mortality following the argument given before. For this
particular mechanism we would expect a sizeable di⁄erence when mortality rates
at later ages are included. These di⁄erences o⁄er some interesting possibilities
that will be explored in the empirical part of the paper.
4Further developments made parental utility dependent not on the children￿ s human capital
but on the children￿ s future utility. The results of the model remain similar, however, once
we consider that the children￿ s future utility is a function of their human capital (Becker and
Barro 1988).
5The consideration of a quantity-quality tradeo⁄ for children does not have to lead to the
conclusion that lower mortality rates produce declines in fertility. Hazan and Zoabi (2006)
constitute an interesting exception to this common result.
6We are aware that researchers in psychology would object to this claim by noting that
much of a child￿ s learning takes place in the early years. This objection does not invalidate
our argument if this learning is not costly to parents. Human capital formation with explicit
costs to parents (schooling, university studies) takes place only from age 6 onwards.
6All of the above mentioned theoretical linkages abstract from the time di-
mension of the mortality-fertility relationship by assuming that parents know
all current mortality rates when taking their fertility decisions. This is a natural
assumption within theoretical models but needs to be revised for empirical work.
Since the early days of the classical transition theory it has been common to
assume a lag of several years between mortality declines and the corresponding
changes in fertility. Falling mortality rates are not readily observable for house-
holds and it is only after one or two decades, when cumulated changes become
obvious to everyone, that families might feel con￿dent enough to take them into
account in their fertility plans. Our empirical study allows for this dynamic
pattern by using di⁄erent lagged values of mortality rates as determinants of
current fertility.
A ￿nal note is required to make clear the di⁄erence between gross and net
fertility. Gross fertility is simply the total number of births per person, net
fertility is the total number of surviving children per person where survival is
typically understood as reaching sexual maturity. Mortality may have a clear
e⁄ect on gross fertility through any of the mechanisms mentioned previously,
but the e⁄ect on net fertility is often less staightforward. Assume mortality
falls and this leads to a reduction in the number of births. It is not clear that
the number of surviving children will also be lower since a smaller proportion
of those births will die in infancy. Thus, the e⁄ect of mortality on net fertility
should be expected to be smaller, and eventually even of opposite sign, to the
e⁄ect on gross fertility7.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and methodology
This section provides an empirical analysis of the e⁄ects of mortality rates on
gross and net fertility using mortality and fertility data from the United Nations￿
7A simple formalization of the argument would assume a two-period model in which gross
fertility is a positive function of mortality rates, GF(m) with GF0 > 0, and mortality takes
place only in the ￿rst period. Net fertility would be de￿ned as the number of children surviving
to the second period: NF = (1 ￿ m)GF:
It follows that the elasticity of net fertility with respect to the rate of mortality would be
"NF = "GF ￿ m
1￿m , where "GF > 0 is the elasticity of gross fertility with respect to mortality.
In other words, "NF is necessarily smaller than "GF and potentially of negative sign.
7Common Database and several relevant econometric techniques to deal with the
problems of unobserved country-speci￿c characteristics and endogeneity bias.
It is a well-known fact that mortality and fertility rates are strongly corre-
lated. Indeed, in the dataset we use in this paper and which covers most devel-
oping and developed countries over the period 1955 - 2005 the simple correlation
between child mortality and total fertility rates is 0:82 while that between life
expectancy (a negative function of mortality rates) and total fertility rates is
￿0:86.
Correlation does not imply causation, however, and we must remain prudent
in face of these numbers. First, mortality is far from being the only variable
strongly correlated with fertility so any hypothesis of a causal relationship must
be analyzed in a multivariate context. Second, causality might very well run
in the opposite direction - from fertility to mortality - as the presence of many
children implies less resources per child and thus poorer health and nutrition.
In other words, serious consideration should be given to endogeneity problems.
In addition to this, the time dimension should not be overlooked and our
empirical model must allow for realistic time lags between mortality and fertility.
Our baseline econometric speci￿cation will thus be as follows:






￿jxi;t;j + "i;t (1)
where fi;t is a measure of fertility for country i at time t, mi;t￿s is a corre-
sponding measure of mortality with a lag of s years, xi;t;j are a set of control
variables that also a⁄ect fertility and ￿i are country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects.
As stated, equation (1) will incorporate several lags of the mortality measure
in order to account for the e⁄ect of this variable over time. We will use three
versions of equation (1) throughout our empirical work: one in which mortality
a⁄ects fertility only contemporaneously (S = f0g) and two in which the e⁄ect
extends over 10 and 20 years respectively (S = f0;10g and S = f0;10;20g)8:
In each case we will be interested not only in the individual coe¢ cients ￿s but
8Other lag structures give similar results. Including lags at ￿ve-year intervals results in
multicollinearity.
8also in the sum of coe¢ cients
P
s ￿s , which can be interpreted as the overall
long run e⁄ect of a change in mortality rates.
The presence of ￿xed e⁄ects in equation (1) is important as there might be
several additional country-speci￿c factors that a⁄ect fertility which we would
like to control for (culture, religion, climate and so on). This speci￿cation is
clearly superior to the inclusion of dummies for, say, Muslim countries or African
countries since we allow for every Muslim and African country to be di⁄erent.
With this speci￿cation, only the within-country variability is used to determine
the relationship between mortality and fertility.
Three alternative econometric procedures will be used to estimate equation
(1). Two are standard panel regressions; the ￿rst one with ￿xed e⁄ects and the
second one with ￿xed e⁄ects and time dummies. The inclusion of time dummies
in this context can be subjected to criticism. While periods of unusually high
or low fertility can be observed in some countries or groups of countries (think
of the post-war "baby-boom"), it is doubtful that such a phenomenon occurred
at the global level. Time dummies could simply pick up some of the e⁄ect of
other variables, most of which have a clearly de￿ned time trend. It is for these
reasons that we estimate equation (1) both with and without time dummies and
compare the results.
The third econometric procedure is the GMM methodology developed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) in order to deal with endogeneity problems such
as those discussed above. In this procedure we di⁄erence equation (1) and
instrument the regressors in di⁄erences with the adequate lags of the regressors
in levels. This estimation strategy relies on the assumption that lagged values
of the regressors are uncorrelated with changes in the error term, which we will
maintain throughout this work9.
While this GMM estimation is the only one purposefully developed to deal
with endogeneity, the other two approaches are not to be dismissed on this
9A second estimation strategy that has also gained popularity in the literature is the
system-GMM methodology of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We
do not apply this methodology here since the assumption that it requires in our context,
namely that changes in the regressors xi;t;j are uncorrelated with the country-speci￿c ￿xed-
e⁄ects, is unrealistic. High ￿xed-e⁄ects correspond to the less-developed countries and it is
to be expected that these countries will also present the largest changes in variables such as
mortality or GDP per capita. As discussed by Roodman (2007), system-GMM requires that
"throughout the study period, individuals sampled are in a kind of steady-state"; which is
clearly not our case since we are analyzing transitions from high to low fertility.
9account. While reverse causality may bias the estimated e⁄ect of contempora-
neous mortality on fertility, this is much less of a concern with respect to lagged
values of mortality. Indeed, we may assume safely that 10 and 20 year lags of
mortality are not a⁄ected by current fertility and therefore that their estimated
coe¢ cients do not su⁄er from bias.
Turning on to the data, we use the following two popular measures of gross
and net fertility:
￿ The Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is de￿ned as the number of children
that would be born per woman if she faced the age-speci￿c fertility rates
prevailing in a given country at a given year during each of her child-
bearing years10.
￿ The Net Reproduction Rate (NRR), de￿ned as the number of daughters
that would be born per woman if she faced the age-speci￿c fertility rates
prevailing in a given country at a given year during each of their child-
bearing years and the age-speci￿c mortality rates from her birth until her
child-bearing years11.
We use two alternative measures of mortality, the ￿rst one covering only
child mortality and the second one encompassing all mortality rates:





where fj are fertility rates at age j and ￿0 and ￿1 are the ￿rst and last age at which women
have children.





where fj are fertility rates at age j (rede￿ned as female births per woman), ￿0 and ￿1 are
the ￿rst and last age at which women have children and sj is the survival rate to age j: The
survival rate is de￿ned as:
sj = (1 ￿ m0)(1 ￿ m1):::(1 ￿ mj￿1)




(1 ￿ m￿0):::(1 ￿ mj￿1)fj
This last expression shows that the NRR is also the number of daughters that would survive
until the beginning of their child-bearing years for each woman entering her child-bearing
years.
10￿ The child mortality rate, the number of deaths between ages 0 and 5 per
1000 live births.
￿ Life expectancy at birth, the average number of years that a person would
live if faced with all age-speci￿c mortality rates prevalent in a given coun-
try at a given year.
As we advanced before, the interest of considering these two measures of
mortality is that di⁄erent theoretical mechanisms emphasize the role of mor-
tality rates at di⁄erent ages. If we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of life expectancy on
fertility is of similar magnitude to that of child mortality on fertility, we would
conclude that mortality rates after age 5 can be pretty much ignored from the
relationship. This, in turn, could be interpreted as evidence in favour of the
physiological, replacement and hoarding e⁄ects and against a major role of the
quantity-quality tradeo⁄e⁄ect. If, on the other hand, changes in life expectancy
lead to a larger e⁄ect on fertility than changes in child mortality, we would have
evidence in favour of a sizeable quantity-quality tradeo⁄ e⁄ect.
Finally, the control variables that we include alongside mortality are chosen
to take into account some of the most popular factors used in the economics
and demographic literatures to explain fertility declines:
￿ The level of education, as measured by the average number of years of
schooling for the population aged 15 or over.
￿ The level of economic development, as measured by the country￿ s GDP
per capita (measured in logs).
￿ The level of urbanization, as measured by the urban ratio.
Economic development, or the closely related concept of technological progress,
has ￿gured prominently in much of the recent uni￿ed growth literature as a
driver of fertility levels. For example, as countries grow rich the relative price of
goods with respect to children would fall since children use up a given amount
of parental time whereas goods require less and less (work) time to be a⁄orded.
This, in turn, could induce parents to substitute goods for children. Alterna-
tively, as technological progress makes human capital a more valuable asset than
physical strength, parents would chose to reduce their quantity of children and
improve their quality.
11Education has also been a major component of uni￿ed growth models through
the quantity-quality tradeo⁄, although its inclusion as an exogenous factor here
corresponds more to the role assigned to it by the demographic literature. Fi-
nally, urbanization was one of the most popular socioeconomic variables (along-
side education and economic development) that demographers used to charac-
terize the process of "modernization" which would bring falling fertility rates
with a certain lag. Urban life was thought to alter the perceptions towards
fertility control and emancipate women from a traditional paternal society.
The source for our measures of gross and net fertility, child mortality, life
expectancy and the urban ratio is the United Nations￿Common Database. This
source provides us with 11 quinquennial observations per country from 1955 to
200512. The average number of years of schooling is taken from Barro and Lee
(2000) and also consists of quinquennial observations but these cover the period
1960-2000. Quinquennial observations of GDP per capita from 1955 to 2005 are
taken from Maddison (2006). Our regressions cover up to 118 countries over
the period 1960-200013. Most developing countries experienced a demographic
transition, or the initial stages of one, during this period. Let us note, ￿nally,
that we restrained from using other potential explanatory factors of fertility
mentioned in the literature such as female labor force participation or child
labor because of their much more limited time and country coverage.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables and Table 2 is
a matrix of correlations among variables. A fertility transition is usually un-
derstood as the passage from a Total Fertility Rate of around 6 children per
woman to 2 or less children per woman. Net Reproduction Rates are typically
at or below replacement level (one surviving daughter per woman) following a
demographic transition; down from levels of 2 or more. All our regressors are
clearly correlated with gross and net fertility, although mortality and education
present stronger correlations than GDP per capita and the urban ratio, and the
correlations are stronger with gross than with net fertility.
12For life expectancy there are no observations for 2005.
13Most variables are available for as many as 152 countries, but the data on education
severely reduces this number. It is still the case, though, that all major developing and
developed countries are included in our regressions.
123.2 Results
The e⁄ect of child mortality on Total Fertility Rates is analyzed in table 3, while
table 4 considers Net Reproduction Rates. These and each of the following
tables report the results of nine regressions since we estimate each relationship
using three econometric procedures and, for each procedure, three alternative lag
structures for mortality. According to the theoretical mechanisms reviewed in
the preceding section, we would expect a positive relationship between mortality
and gross fertility, though the e⁄ect may appear only with a lag. Net fertility,
on the other hand, should present a contemporaneous negative relationship with
mortality as higher mortality rates will decrease the number of surviving children
immediately. With a lag, however, we would expect net fertility to be a⁄ected
positively through the e⁄ect on the number of births; which of these two e⁄ects
dominate is a question left for the empirical analysis to answer.
A ￿rst result that emerges from table 3 is that the time dimension is indeed
important in the relationship between mortality and fertility. Columns (1), (4)
and (7) would lead to think than there is a contemporaneous e⁄ect of child
mortality on fertility, but this coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant only when
the lagged values of mortality are not present. Once we include the 10 year or
20 year lags of child mortality, we obtain an intuitive dynamic pattern with very
mild e⁄ects contemporaneously and strong e⁄ects arriving with a 10 year lag.
We also observe that the e⁄ect "dies out" after 10 years, with a small residual
e⁄ect being reported for the 20 year lag.
The inclusion of time dummies alters results only marginally, as a comparison
of columns (1)-(3) with columns (4)-(6) shows. In both cases the total e⁄ect of
child mortality on gross fertility after 20 years, the sum of coe¢ cients
P
s ￿s,
is close to 0:0125: This number implies that a fall in child mortality of one
standard deviation would produce a decline in TFRs of 1:13 children per woman,
a large and meaningful e⁄ect. The size of the e⁄ect is reduced in the GMM
estimates, though it remains clearly statistically signi￿cant. Note, additionally,
that studying the e⁄ect of mortality on fertility using only contemporaneous
mortality rates would give us a much reduced e⁄ect; further supporting the case
for the approach used in this paper.
13Turning to our control variables, education and the urban ratio appear to
have a sizeable e⁄ect on fertility while GDP per capita turns out to be a much
weaker predictor of fertility. Our measure of education is statistically signi￿cant
in all regressions and its value is maintained when we include time dummies or
when we use the GMM methodology. With a coe¢ cient of around ￿0:300,
a one standard deviation increase in education is associated with a decline in
TFRs of 0:87. The urban ratio is also signi￿cant in the ￿rst six columns but
loses signi￿cance in some GMM regressions. The size of its coe¢ cient, however,
implies an e⁄ect on fertility of roughly similar size to that of education.
GDP per capita, ￿nally, becomes statistically not signi￿cant (and, against
standard theory, even of positive sign) as soon as we include any lag of mortality.
In the GMM regressions GDP per capita is never signi￿cant and its coe¢ cient
is always positive. These results are strong indication of a weak role of GDP
per capita when compared with mortality or education.
In table 4 we turn our attention to the e⁄ects of child mortality on net
fertility. The results are consistent with those presented in table 3. Table 3
revealed that, once we include lagged values of child mortality, the contempora-
neous e⁄ect of this variable is not statistically signi￿cant; in accordance with the
hypothesis that families need some time to "internalize" changes in the socioe-
conomic environment. As discussed before, however, net fertility should still be
a⁄ected immediately through the change in survival probabilities for children.
This is indeed the case, the non-lagged level of child mortality has a negative
and strongly signi￿cant e⁄ect on NRRs.
Columns (3) and (6) indicate that this initial e⁄ect is roughly countered
after 10 years; by which time the net e⁄ect on NRRs is about zero. The overall
e⁄ect does not manage to become clearly positive even after 20 years, however,
since 20 year lags have a relatively small additional e⁄ect. As table 4 shows,
the sum of coe¢ cients on child mortality never reaches statistical signi￿cance
with a positive sign. GMM estimates conserve this same pattern but once again
reduce the e⁄ect of mortality in most regressions.
Regarding the rest of the variables, results are once again consistent with
education being always signi￿cant and large, the urban ratio usually signi￿cant
and with a somewhat smaller e⁄ect and GDP per capita being not signi￿cant
once mortality lags are included.
14To summarize the results of tables 3 and 4, child mortality has important
e⁄ects on both gross and net fertility but the overall e⁄ect on net fertility after
20 years is still subject to doubt since it is not statistically signi￿cant (and even
negative in the GMM regression). We proceed by considering life expectancy at
birth as our measure of mortality, incorporating in this way all mortality rates
that have been left out until now.
Table 5 reports the results for gross fertility and table 6 for net fertility. In
these two tables we have pre-multiplied life expectancy by the factor (￿1) in
order to have a positive function of mortality rates. In this way the expected
signs of the coe¢ cients are the same as those for tables 3 and 4.
The results in table 5 have many similarities with those reviewed in table 3
but also some interesting di⁄erences. Changes in life expectancy do not a⁄ect
TFRs contemporaneously once lagged values are taken into account, as was the
case with child mortality rates. On the other hand, the e⁄ects of life expectancy
do not "die out" after 10 years but have a similar or even larger e⁄ect at 20
year lags than at 10 year lags. This result would be consistent with changes in
post-childhood mortality rates being more di¢ cult to identify and evaluate than
changes in childhood mortality, maybe because of their lower overall levels.
Correspondingly, the overall e⁄ect of longer life expectancy on gross fertility
after 20 years appears to be larger than that obtained with child mortality.
Columns (3), (6) and (9) predict an overall decline of TFRs of between 1:61
and 2:01 children per woman following a one standard deviation increase in life
expectancy. It is also noteworthy that this time the results from the GMM
equations are very similar to those of the traditional panel techniques.
With respect to all other variables, their e⁄ects remain very similar: educa-
tion has always a negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect, GDP per capita is
not robust to the inclusion of all lags of mortality or to the GMM estimation
and the urban ratio is somewhere between these two. In addition, we remark
that the use of life expectancy instead of child mortality has tended to produce
smaller coe¢ cients for most control variables: the size of the e⁄ect of education
is up to a third smaller than what it was in table 3 and for the urban ratio
the reduction can be even larger. We hypothesize that the e⁄ect of the omitted
post-childhood mortality rates in table 3 was partially taken up by our control
variables.
15When we turn our attention to net fertility (table 6), the results are af-
fected in consequence. We ￿nd again the intuitive result that net fertility is
negatively related to contemporaneous changes in mortality rates, as denoted
by the negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the non-lagged level of
life expectancy. The changes in parental behavior that follow over the next 20
years, however, are now found to more than compensate this initial e⁄ect. In
our three estimation procedures, the sum of coe¢ cients becomes positive and
statistically signi￿cant once we extend the lag length to 20 years. This sum of
coe¢ cients takes values between 0:026 and 0:037, implying a reduction of NRRs
of between 0:32 and 0:46 for a one standard deviation increase in life expectancy.
Thus, besides being statistically signi￿cant, this result is economically impor-
tant. And once again, the GMM results are very similar to those obtained in
the other regressions.
The results of tables 5 and 6 reinforce the role of mortality reductions and
highlight the fact that mortality rates after the age of 5 are also an important
factor in fertility decisions. As discussed before, this can be interpreted as
evidence that mortality a⁄ects fertility through the quantity-quality tradeo⁄for
children. The physiological, replacement and hoarding e⁄ects cannot be ruled
out, however, as child mortality by itself has also a sizeable e⁄ect on fertility.
This could denote the importance of the three aforementioned e⁄ects or simply
the fact that child mortality is highly correlated with mortality rates at other
ages.
If we compare mortality with our other control variables we conclude that
only education is able to match the magnitude of the e⁄ect of mortality on
fertility. The urban ratio and GDP per capita have considerably smaller e⁄ects
which are often not statistically signi￿cant. In table 6, for instance, the e⁄ect
of education on net fertility is between 0:26 and 0:43 while those of GDP per
capita and the urban ratio are between 0:07 and 0:09 and between 0:05 and 0:07
respectively14. This is to compare with the overall e⁄ect of life expectancy on
NRRs, which is between 0:32 and 0:46. For gross fertility, the results in table
5 show an even larger di⁄erence between the e⁄ect of life expectancy and those
of all other control variables, including education.
It is thus the case that mortality appears as a major determinant of fertility
14E⁄ects of a one standard deviation change in each explanatory factor. Calculated using
the regressions with all lags of life expectancy, columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 6.
16changes; one whose e⁄ects can account for a large share of the change in fertility
rates that we observe through demographic transitions. GDP per capita, on the
other hand, has a much smaller e⁄ect and is statistically rejected in our most
complete speci￿cations.
4 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the ongoing research e⁄ort improving our understand-
ing of demographic transitions. The uni￿ed growth literature has produced
many valuable theoretical contributions in this area, but we are lacking empir-
ical studies to help us di⁄erentiate between ￿rst and second order mechanisms.
We advance in that direction by analyzing in detail the role of mortality as a
cause of fertility reductions while controlling for other prominent factors used
in the literature, namely GDP per capita, education and urbanization.
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
(i) Mortality changes have a large impact on fertility reductions and can
account for a major part of the fertility change characterizing demographic
transitions. The e⁄ect is robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations, including GMM
estimations accounting for endogeneity.
(ii) Both gross and net fertility are a⁄ected. The overall e⁄ect on net
fertility becomes statistically signi￿cant once we take into account post-
childhood mortality rates.
(iii) Gross fertility reacts to mortality changes with a lag of about 10
years; the e⁄ects continue to be felt after 20 years. Net fertility has an
initial negative relationship with mortality; the direction of the e⁄ect being
reversed after 10 years.
(iv) Compared with other factors, the e⁄ect of mortality is larger than
those of GDP per capita and the urban ratio. Only education has an
e⁄ect of similar magnitude in some regressions.
(v) The importance of post-childhood mortality rates points towards the
existence of a quantity-quality tradeo⁄ e⁄ect of mortality. Other mecha-
nism such as the physiological, replacement and hoarding e⁄ect can also
be present.
17Turning back to the theoretical literature, our results bring support to the
large part of the literature emphasizing the role of mortality changes but at the
same time sides against the equally large part of the literature whose mechanisms
are based on changes in GDP per capita or, more often, technological change.
While the link between technological change and GDP per capita might be
tenuous in the short run, over a time horizon of several decades like the one
considered here a strong link can be reasonably expected. We must be cautious,
however, before ruling out economic development in this context. While we have
found a small or even inexistent direct e⁄ect of GDP per capita on fertility, many
indirect channels might be in place. In particular, economic development might
be a major cause of mortality reductions and would therefore a⁄ect fertility
through this last variable.
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Min. Max.  Number  of 
obs. 
Total Fertility Rate 
 
4.59 2.08 0.94 8.70 1672 
Net Reproduction 
Rate 
1.74 0.64 0.45 3.31 1672 
Child Mortality 
 
105.50  90.76 3.0 500.0  1447 
Life Expectancy 
 
58.32 12.50 23.60 80.53 1520 
Average years of 
schooling 
4.87 2.91 0.09  12.05 932 
GDP per capita (in 
logs) 
7.90 1.10 5.35  10.38  1485 
Urban ratio 
 
44.08  24.36 1.40 100.0 1672 
 Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
 




















Total  Fertility  Rate  1       
Net Reproduction 
Rate 
0.9385  1       
Child  Mortality  0.8194  0.5957  1      
Life Expectancy  -0.8644  -0.6642  -0.9557  1       
Average years of 
schooling 
-0.8485 -0.7391  -0.8228  0.8583  1     
GDP per capita (in 
logs) 
-0.7723 -0.6385  -0.8100  0.8651 0.8157  1   
Urban  ratio  -0.6940 -0.5444  -0.7592 0.7970 0.7619 0.8443  1 Table 3 
The effects of child mortality on gross fertility. 
 
  Dependent variable: Total Fertility Rates 
  Panel with fixed effects 
 




   
Child mortality  0.0049 -0.0002 -0.0020 0.0053 0.0012 -0.0014 0.001 -0.0161 -0.0079
  0 0.887 0.255 0 0.475 0.387 0.801 0.011 0.107
Child mortality, 
lagged 10 years    0.0086 0.0126  0.0075 0.0136  0.0149 0.0145
   0 0  0 0   0.001 0
Child mortality, 
lagged 20 years 
 
   0.0017    0.0005    0.0008
     0.454    0.818    0.822
Sum of 
coefficients on 
child mortality  0.0049  0.0084 0.0123 0.0053 0.0087 0.0127 0.0007 -0.0012 0.0074




-0.395 -0.301 -0.231 -0.323 -0.308 -0.249 -0.637 -0.38 -0.364
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.036 0.029
GDP per capita 
(in logs) 
 
-0.304 -0.212 0.027 -0.392 -0.196 0.063 0.153 0.436 0.371
  0.003 0.042 0.781 0 0.072 0.544 0.591 0.163 0.124
 
Urban ratio  -0.019 -0.027 -0.026 -0.017 -0.027 -0.027 -0.024 -0.031 -0.048
  0.005 0 0.001 0.011 0 0 0.336 0.157 0.016
           
Observations  898 711 514 898 711 514 779 593 399
Countries  117 117 115 117 117 115 105 105 103




























Note: estimated coefficients are in bold and p-values are given below them. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors. Table 4 
The effects of child mortality on net fertility. 
 
  Dependent variable: Net Reproduction Rates 
  Panel with fixed effects 
 




   
Child mortality  -0.0017 -0.0036 -0.0041 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0053 -0.0114 -0.0074
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002
Child mortality, 
lagged  10  years   0.0033 0.0040  0.0024 0.0044  0.0060 0.0048
    0 0  0.007 0  0.005 0.004
Child mortality, 
lagged  20  years     0.0015    0.0005    0.0007
     0.167    0.64    0.667
Sum of 
coefficients on 
child mortality  -0.0017  -0.0003 0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0019
  0.0000 0.558 0.1405 0.0000 0.4329 0.3036 0.0000 0.0016 0.3118
Average years 
of education  -0.184  -0.153 -0.124 -0.141 -0.141 -0.117 -0.267 -0.167 -0.169
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.064 0.038
GDP per capita 
(in logs)  -0.161  -0.106 0.012 -0.201 -0.092 0.036 -0.068 -0.198 0.2
  0 0.03 0.804 0 0.069 0.48 0.625 0.205 0.116
 
Urban ratio  -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 -0.004 -0.009 -0.011 -0.006 -0.012 -0.023
  0.37 0.001 0 0.108 0.003 0.001 0.569 0.264 0.02
           
Observations  898 711 514 898 711 514 779 593 399
Countries  117 117 115 117 117 115 105 105 103




























Note: estimated coefficients are in bold and p-values are given below them. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors. Table 5 
The effects of life expectancy on gross fertility. 
 
  Dependent variable: Total Fertility Rates 
  Panel with fixed effects 
 




   
Life expectancy  0.053  - 0.016 - 0.009 0.058 - 0.011 - 0.002 0.056 - 0.059 - 0.016
  0 0.092 0.366 0 0.268 0.838 0.03 0.008 0.332
Life expectancy  
lagged  10  years   0.132 0.069  0.146 0.073  0.172 0.050









  00 00 0 0 . 0 0     3
Life expectancy 
lagged  20  years     0.069    0.090    0.110
     0    0    0.000
Sum of 
coefficients on 
life expectancy  0.053  0.116 0.129 0.058 0.135 0.161 0.056 0.113 0.144
  0.000 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0.0300 0 0
Average years 
of education  -0.365  -0.194 -0.139 -0.286 -0.243 -0.216 -0.413 -0.303 -0.231
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.080
GDP per capita 
(in logs)  -0.227  -0.281 0.004 -0.305 -0.319 0.025 -0.323 -0.279 0.180
  0.018 0.002 0.966 0.001 0.001 0.794 0.206 0.274 0.403
 
Urban ratio  -0.017 0.002 -0.013 -0.015 -0.002 -0.017 -0.026 0.027 -0.010
  0.011 0.708 0.045 0.024 0.807 0.006 0.188 0.153 0.547
           
Observations  911 818 629 911 818 629 791 698 510
Countries  118 118 118 118 118 118 106 106 106



















Note: estimated coefficients are in bold and p-values are given below them. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors. Table 6 





























  Dependent variable: Net Reproduction Rates 
  Panel with fixed effects 
 




   
Life expectancy  - 0.012  - 0.035 - 0.029 - 0.010 - 0.032 - 0.025 - 0.010 - 0.052 - 0.031
  0.007 0 0 0.038 0 0 0.393 0 0.001
Life expectancy  
lagged  10  years   0.048 0.020  0.050 0.019  0.065 0.012
   0 0.021  0 0.035  0 0.274
Life expectancy 
lagged  20  years     0.035    0.043    0.050
     0 0 0      
Sum of 
coefficients on 
life expectancy  - 0.012  0.013 0.026 - 0.010 0.018 0.037 - 0.010 0.013       0.031
  0.007 0.0028 0 0.0380 0.0003 0 0.3930 0.2195 0.0191
Average years 
of education  -0.193  -0.128 -0.090 -0.153 -0.139 -0.120 -0.244 -0.195 -0.147
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.005 0.018
GDP per capita 
(in logs)  -0.196  -0.209 -0.081 -0.236 -0.225 -0.068 -0.305 -0.275 -0.077
  0 0 0.057 0 0 0.122 0.024 0.043 0.433
 
Urban ratio  -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.022 0.005
  0.272 0.149 0.466 0.486 0.326 0.18 0.73 0.014 0.484
           
Observations  911 818 629 911 818 629 791 698 510
Countries  118 118 118 118 118 118 106 106 106
Instruments         136 133 115
Note: estimated coefficients are in bold and p-values are given below them. P-values are calculated using robust standard errors. 